material content. The authors do not trace how the principle of autonomy was limited by the requirements of justice through the medieval legal and ethical period.
The authors also try to determine when paternalistic actions may be justified. when autonomy can be limited by beneficence. Paternalism is defined as the intentional limitation of the autonomy of the patient in order to promote beneficence. They try to make these determinations by studying a hard case where a young man wanted to die rather than undergo painful and disfiguring burn treatments. He clearly wanted to die and control his own fate, but this was not to be permitted. Their study of this issue was hampered, however, because they failed to develop a theory which differentiates mandated treatments and electable care. Their theories of paternalism, autonomy and beneficence cannot generate these specific, concrete and practical principles and this calls into question all of their analyses.
This book seems to have a preoccupation with rational suicide, and this concern seems to motivate the authors' study of paternalistic action. According to their principles, it is not clear how a paternalistic physician would be able to intervene to prohibit clear suicidal attempts by competent terminally ill patients. The authors object that permitting this would result only from a wooden reading of the principle of autonomy, but the principles of beneficence and paternalism are so formal and abstract that it is not clear why this reading would not be legitimate.
Most argue for a limited paternalism policy. but it is difficult to determine the boundaries of this sort of policy. The authors distinguish between strong and weak paternalism and argue that weak paternalism collapses into the pure autonomy model. Weak paternalism holds that autonomy can be limited only if a patient is substantially non-autonomous, while strong paternalism holds that intervention can occur only when actions affect just the person himself. Both of these have their problems, as weak paternalism would probably permit a frightened stroke victim to go without protection, while strong paternalism would probably force useless and costly treatments on some patients. The authors need a theory of extraordinary medical treatments to explain why paternalism is justified in certain instances. They reduce the problem of paternalism to problems of autonomy and beneficence and call for a more comprehensive theory, but are unable to come to a clear and satisfactory resolution to their problems due to the abstractness of the fundamental principles they invoke.
The authors attempt to resolve problems of treating patients with diminished competency and reduced autonomy, which is a serious problem because of their strong commitment to patient autonomy . They find it difficult to prohibit "rational suicide" because the principles requiring beneficence against clear and strongly autonomous decisions are very weak. Their judgments are hampered, howevq, by the lack of a theory of ordinary, required and mandatory medical treatments which cannot be withheld or rejected without violating justice. The authors seem uneasy with permitting rational suicide. but they cannot argue strongly against it because they do not believe that there are any medical treatments which must be provided and received.
It would seem that suicide becomes a morally acceptable alternative in their theory because of the formal and abstract criteria they establish for reduced autonomy. If a patient can demonstrate that there are no external or internal constraints and show knowledge and understanding of a situation, then he or she could choose an action such as suicide by benign neglect. The language used to define external constraints is so vague, however, that it could never be clear if a person was free from them. The two writers develop conditions that limit autonomy. but they are not as precise as the traditional passion, fear, ignorance.
Competence is ambiguously defined as the ability to perform a task. The criteria for competence are quite vague, such as the requirement that a rational reason for a choice be given. or the failure to give a risk ! benefit calculus. They recognize that labelinga person as incompetent can create all sorts of paternalistic events, but they hold that errors should be made on the beneficence side of the issue, even though it is difficult to decide what constitutes beneficence. To their credit. the authors recognize that determining or even defining competency is extremely difficult. Because of emotional factors or the inability of
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Linacre Quarterly a pati ent to accept the reality of a co nditi o n, a co mpete nt jud gment may be difficult. Beauchamp and McCullough recogn ize th at rationality or ab ilit y to understand a situation does not mea n that a pati en t can make a competent d ec ision.
Th e authors c hallenge the notion that the physician must a lways act in the best int eres ts of the patient and they hold that third party interests ma y be pro mot ed at t he expe nse of th e pati ent in so me cases. They would allow psychological a nd e moti o nal co nseque nces of treatment to justify withholding beneficial trea tme nt s from infan ts, for in sta nce. But th e reaso ns they give for upholding third-party int e rests are quite vague, abstract. form a l and difficult to apply in concrete circumstances. They ho ld tha t th e pa ti e nt' s int eres ts only impose a primajacie dut y that can be overridden when so d o in g brings about a g rea te r good.
Determining when one can promote third part y int erests is done by weighing va riou s harms and benefits, which is esse ntiall y a co nseq uen tialist ana lys is. The fund a me ntal probl em with this met hod o logy is that one never knows what harm s and benefit s are to be includ ed and one ne ve r knows w he n to stop sea rc hin g for vlllues to be weighed. Wh e n they urge that patient interests eith er be upheld or overridden, the authors invoke bene fice nce, but they neve r sho w why there is a clear dut y t o act bene fi ce ntly as benefice nce cou ld plau sibly compel action in another direction. They in voke the " best interests" stand a rd either to warrant or prohibit paternalist ic action, but th ey ne ve r give pers uasive reasons why this purely formal standard requires th eir reco mmended action.
Thi s book was quite dissatisfying because it relies so lely on abstract and formal principl es. The authors almost seem fearful of esta bli s hing co ncrete, bindin g moral norm s for medical practice, and one sus pects that th ey want medical-ethical norm s to be purel y formal so that th ese norms ca n be used to permit or prohibit whatever th ey desire. There is no discu ss ion of ba sic human goods or th e virtu es, which is ve ry pec uliar fo r a work in medical ethics. They seem to assume that justice will be achieved by merely acting beneficentl y or by protecting autonomy, however they a re defin ed.
The formalit y and abstractness of contemporary ethics should be a matter of concern, as we now see a campaign to legali ze euthanasia brea king upon our co untry. Th ere is virtually no mention of the dut y to trea t patie nts, and only occasionally is there any mention mad e ofa "t herapeutic privilege". They fail to consider th e nature of medical treatme nt s and th e conditions of patients to show how those impinge upon the moral character of judgme nts. Thi s book seems to be an endorsement of the pure and contentless patient autonomy model which all but obliterates ethical duties and obligations of hea lth care providers. If it is true that thi s mod el is gaining d o minance in our country, then it mi g ht be necessary to take measures to protect the duti es and obligations of physicia ns to proVi de care and trea tment for medically vulnerable perso ns. "It might be said by some tha t thi s whole work is far too relativistic, that it accepts too easily the claim that there are other significant moral alternatives, and that it therefore provides no absolute foundation for the choice of th ese id ea ls and the associated ethical May, 1986 
